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What	does	John	Calvin	have	to	say	about	what	it	means	to	be	human?	
For	 many,	 the	 quick	 answer	 might	 be,	 not much!	 Calvin	 was	 a	
rhetorician	and	his	pronouncements	such	as	man	is	a	‘five-foot	worm’	
(I.5.4)1	or	‘a	grub	crawling	upon	the	earth’	(II.6.4)	do	not	endear	us	
to	him	quickly.	But	is	there	more	behind	the	rhetoric?	Can	we	in	the	
twenty-first	century	garner	anything	from	Calvin’s	insights?	
Calvin	 wrote	 theology	 in	 an	 era	 where	 humanity	 was	 exalted	
to	 an	 astonishing	 degree.	 Caught	 up	 in	 the	 scene	 of	 humanism,	
leading	 theologians	 in	 the	 church	 celebrated	 the	 spiritual	 potential	
of	humanity	with	an	almost	unchecked	enthusiasm.	To	counter	this,	
Calvin	and	other	Reformers	wrote	about	humanity	with	a	necessary	
austerity	demanded	by	the	times.	Their	negative	discourse	sounds	off-
key	to	our	ears	and,	unless	we	are	patient	and	discerning,	can	hide	the	
radical	message	about	what	it	means	to	be	human.	It	is	only	when	the	
rhetorical	force	of	Calvin’s	language	–	so	suitable	for	heading	off	the	
dangers	of	medieval	claims	–	has	been	de-contextualised	and	made	
absolute	does	his	message	become	twisted	and	unrecognizable.	
Even	Calvin	knew	himself	to	be,	at	times,	carried	away	by	the	force	
of	his	own	rhetoric.	True	to	fashion	he	will	calmly	stop,	rein	himself	
in,	and	recapture	the	larger	picture.	Quoting	Bernard	of	Clairvaux,	he	
reminds	himself,
“[…]	Man is nought.	Yet	how	can	he	whom	God	magnifies	be	
utterly	nothing?	How	can	he	upon	whom	God	has	set	his	heart	
be	nothing?	
“Brethren,	let	us	take	heart	again.	Even	if	we	are	nothing	in	
our	own	hearts,	perchance	something	of	us	may	be	hidden	in	
the	heart	of	God.	(III.2.25,	my	emphasis)
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Calvin	is	keenly	aware	that	sin	distorts	our	self-perception,	whether	
toward	pride	or	self-hatred.	It	 is	only	God’s	perspective	that	can	be	
trusted.	He	states	(again	quoting	Bernard)	that	we	must	examine	‘how	
from	the	one	point	of	view	we	are	nothing,	and	from	the	other	how	
magnified’.	As	 a	 result	 of	 perceiving	 ourselves	 through	 the	 divine	
perspective,	our	‘glorying’	will	be	‘better	founded	than	before,	so	that	
we	glory	not	in	ourselves	but	in	the	Lord’.	(III.2.25)
What,	 then,	 is	 the	 divine	perspective	 that	Calvin	 counsels	 us	 to	
adopt	regarding	what	it	means	to	be	human?	Let	us	turn	to	his	picture	
of	life	in	the	Garden	of	Eden,	and	pull	apart	his	language	and	images	
for	some	important	clues.
Communion in the garden
Calvin’s	concept	of	the	world	is	as	the	sphere	for	communion	–	the	
trysting	place	between	God	and	humanity.	Calvin	uses	the	traditional	
features	of	the	Garden	of	Eden	to	retell	the	story	of	humanity	whose	
purpose	is	to	be	near	God.	Adam	is	not	the	superhero	that	Augustine	
had	 made	 him	 out	 to	 be,	 with	 intelligence	 like	 that	 of	 the	 angels.	
Rather,	he	is	a	fragile	being,	glorious	in	the	quality	of	his	dependence	
upon	God.	‘At	that	time,	I	say,	when	[Adam]	had	been	advanced	to	the	
highest	degree	of	honor,	Scripture	attributed	nothing	else	to	him	than	
that	he	had	been	created	in	the	image	of	God,	thus	suggesting	that	man	
was	blessed,	not	because	of	his	own	good	actions,	but	by participation 
in God.’	(II.2.1,	my	emphasis)	Here	we	note	the	absence	of	attributes	
and	‘perfections’	typical	of	medieval	discussions	of	Adam;	in	its	place	
is	a	mode of being,	where	Adam	stays	near	 to	God,	participating	in	
him	for	the	glory	that	Adam	himself	exhibits.
This	is	a	typical	move	for	Calvin,	who	takes	the	focus	off	humanity	
in	itself	and	instead	considers	the	human	being	in	terms	of	its	relations.	
Life	in	the	garden	is	characterized	by	living by the Word	–	seeking	all	
good	things	in	him,	not	merely	from	him.	Already	from	the	first	few	
lines	of	Genesis,	Calvin	is	painting	a	picture	of	humanity	that	stands	
in	sharp	contradistinction	to	our	modern	portrait	of	the	individual.	For	
Calvin,	the	individual	is	–	quite	simply	–	a	myth.	Adam	and	Eve	are	
not	 superhumans	who	 relate	 to	God	 because	 they	 can,	 but	 because	
they	can	exist	in	no	other	way.	God	chooses	to	share	himself	in	such	
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a	way	 that	Adam’s	being	 is	 incomplete	without	God’s	own:	 ‘direct	
communication	with	God	was	the	source	of	life	to	Adam.’2	In	Calvin’s	
version	of	the	Garden	of	Eden,	the	world	has	been	designed	so	that	
nothing	can	be	had	independently	of	God;	everything	is	to	be	had	in	
and	with	him.	This	is	Calvin’s	meaning	of	what it means to be created.
The	tree	of	life	is	central	for	this	understanding	of	the	communal	
nature	of	what	it	means	to	be	human.	It	stood	as	a	‘visible	testimony	
[to	Adam]	that	“in	God	we	are,	and	live,	and	move.”’3	Yet	Calvin	is	
not	content	 that	Adam	should	generally	be	 ‘spiritual’	 through	some	
kind	of	acknowledgement	of	God.	Calvin	believes	that	the	tree	of	life	
reveals	Adam’s	life	to	be	in Christ,	already	in	the	garden.	‘Wherefore,	
by	this	sign,	Adam	was	admonished,	that	he	could	claim	nothing	for	
himself	as	if	 it	were	his	own,	in	order	that	he	might	depend	wholly	
upon	the	Son	of	God,	and	might	not	seek	life	anywhere	but	in	him.’	
Adam	‘lives	not	by	his	own	power’	but	more	specifically,	he	‘depend[s]	
wholly	upon	the	Son	of	God’	for	‘the	life	of	all	things	was	included	
in	the	Word’.4
Is	 this	Calvin’s	 relentless	 campaign	 to	 strip	Adam	of	 all	 things,	
such	 that	 he	 has	 nothing	 he	 can	 claim	 as	 his	 own?	 To	 emphasize	
Adam’s	 impoverishment?	Far	 from	 it.	Calvin’s	Adam	 is	one	whose	
‘perfect’	status	involves	relationship	with	another.	Adam	cannot	‘own’	
anything	in	the	garden,	except	that	it	brings	him	into	relationship.	The	
flip	side	of	this	is	that	‘our	nature	lacks	everything	that	our	Heavenly	
Father	bestows’	(II.2.20).	The	point	is	not	the	‘lack’,	but	the	‘bestows’.	
Even	the	gift	of	the	divine	image	was	not	automatically	included	
in	the	Edenic	Package	Deal,	as	Calvin	makes	clear.	While	theologians	
prior	to	Calvin	had	sought	to	understand	where	the	divine	image	was	
located	in	humankind	(the	soul?	 the	mind?),	Calvin	believes	 that	‘a	
definition	of	 the	 image	of	God	ought	 to	 rest	on	a	firmer	basis	 than	
such	 subtleties.’5	 Calvin	 begins	 by	 differentiating	 humanity	 from	
the	animal	kingdom	in	this	way:	‘The	likeness	of	God	extends	to	the	
whole	 excellence	 by	which	man’s	 nature	 towers	 over	 all	 the	 kinds	
of	 living	creatures.’	 (I.15.3)	But	 this	 excellence	 tends	 to	be	 formed	
in	 qualitative,	 rather	 than	quantitative	 terms:	 ‘And,	 indeed,	 there	 is	
nothing	in	which	man	excels	the	lower	animals	unless	it	be	his	spiritual 
communion with God	in	the	hope	of	a	blessed	eternity.’6	For	Calvin,	
what	is	crucial	is	not	merely	the	‘endowment’	of	this	excellence	but	
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that	the	excellence	is	turned	toward	God	in	communion.	As	we	have	
observed,	God	does	not	give	Adam	properties	that	would	then	function	
without	him;	their	very	character	demands	communion.	Calvin	says,	
‘He	 does	 not	 indeed	 transfer	 his	 power	 into	 outward	 signs;	 but	 by	
them	he	stretches	out	his	hand	to	us’.7
T.	F.	Torrance	pioneered	 this	 interpretation	with	Calvin’s	use	of	
the	 term	 ‘mirror’.	This	 angle	 allows	Torrance	 to	 prove	 that	Calvin	
never	 intended	 the	 divine	 image	 to	 be	 an	 endowment	 –	 something	
‘owned’	 by	 humanity	 apart	 from	God.	 ‘Strictly	 speaking,	 it	 is	God	
who	images	himself	 in	man	[...]	 there	can	be	no	image	where	there	
is	 no	 one	 beholding.	 [...]	 Imago dei	 has	 to	 do	 fundamentally	 with	
God’s	 beholding	 rather	 than	with	man’s.’8	This,	 however,	 does	 not	
necessarily	tell	the	whole	story.	
Take,	 for	 example,	 the	way	 in	which	Calvin	holds	 together	 two	
differing	 accounts	 of	 wisdom.	 In	 his	 first	 edition	 of	 the	 Institutes	
(1536),	Calvin	writes,
[Adam]	was	 endowed	with	wisdom,	 righteousness,	 holiness,	
and	was	so	clinging	by	these	gifts	of	grace	to	God	that	he	could	
have	lived	forever	in	Him’	(I.2)
In	a	near-contemporary	document,	Psychopannychia,	Calvin	writes,
man,	 in	 respect	 of	 spirit,	was	made	partaker	 of	 the	wisdom,	
justice,	and	goodness	of God.9
Endowed	 with	 wisdom	 or	 partaker	 in	 God’s	 wisdom?	 For	 Calvin,	
participating	in	God’s	gifts	does	not	cut	off	the	possibility	of	these	gifts	
truly	becoming	our	own,	in	our	nature;	but	it	is	the	only	ground	for	
them.	Indeed,	once	Calvin	establishes	the	proper	divine	perspective,	he	
can	say	things	such	as	‘Yet	those	good	works	which	he	has	bestowed	
upon	 us	 the	Lord	 calls	 “ours,”’	 (III.15.3).	Also,	 ‘God,	 then,	 should	
make	himself	ours,	so	that	all	his	things	should	in	a	manner	become	
our	 things’.10	This	 signifies	 that	 the	divine	origin	of	a	gift	does	not	
prohibit	it	from	being	properly	ascribed	to,	or	even	becoming	part	of	
the	creaturely	 realm.	Thus,	 the	 issue	becomes	 irrelevant	whether	or	
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not	humanity	 is	 ‘endowed’	with	various	qualities,	 for	Calvin	 is	 not	
looking	at	humanity	apart	from	God	but	rather	in	its	constant	state	of	
participation	in	Christ.11
Christ and our humanity
Calvin	makes	his	case	for	 the	God-ensconced-human	in	ways	other	
than	his	portrayal	of	Adam.	He	also	tackles	it	from	the	perspective	of	
a	Trinitarian	theology	of	creation	in	which	the	roles	of	the	mediator	
and	the	Spirit	take	primary	place.	
Although	we	more	 commonly	 associate	Christ’s	mediation	with	
reconciliation	 and	 the	 forgiveness	 of	 sin,	 Calvin	 says	 that	 Christ’s	
mediation	is	much	broader	than	that.	Even	Adam	and	Eve	had	need	
of	a	mediator!	‘[B]ut	from	the	beginning	of	creation	he	already	truly	
was	mediator,	for	he	always	was	the	head	of	the	Church,	had	primacy	
over	the	angels,	and	was	the	firstborn	of	every	creature’.12	Calvin	says	
that	the	mediator’s	‘proper	function	[…]	is	to	unite	us	to	God.’13	From	
the	very	beginning,	humanity	was	united	to	God	through	a	mediator.14	
All	creation	is	related	to	God	in	the	second	person	of	the	Trinity	who	
mediates	creation	and	its	telos.	All	things	are	created	by	him,	created	
to	exist	in	him,	and	created	for	perfect	union	with	him	(‘as	far	as	our	
capacities	will	allow’).15	This	is	not	an	arrangement	due	to	sin,	but	to	
the	en Christo	way	that	God	relates	to	humanity.	He	has	not	structured	
a	universe	in	which	life,	grace,	and	‘benefits’	can	be	had	apart	from	
him.
Even	in	the	garden,	Adam	received	life	not	from	God	simpliciter	
but	 from	Christ:	 ‘he	was	 the	mid-point	 (medium)	between	God	and	
creatures,	so	that	the	life	which	was	otherwise	hidden	in	God	would	
flow	 from	him.’16	Not	 only	 did	 life	 flow	 from	 him	but	Adam’s	 life	
was	 in	 him.	 It	 is	 because	Christ	was	 the	 source	of	 life	 to	Adam	 in	
the	garden,	that	Calvin	reasons	that	Christ	–	as	opposed	to	the	other	
members	of	the	Trinity	–	came	to	mediate	reconciliation.	‘Previously,	
direct	 communication	 with	 God	 was	 the	 source	 of	 life	 to	 Adam;	
but,	 from	 the	moment	 in	 which	 he	 became	 alienated	 from	God,	 it	
was	necessary	that	he	should	recover	life	by	the	death	of	Christ,	by 
whose life he then lived.’17	In	this	grand	sweep,	Calvin	is	positioning	
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the	 forthcoming	 redemption	 (mediation-expiation)	 of	 Christ	 within	
a	more	 comprehensive	 story	 –	 that	 of	 the	God	who	 intends	 us	 for	
communion	(mediation-union).
So	what	 does	 this	 all	mean?	Calvin	 has	 introduced	 an	 intimacy	
between	Creator	and	creation	 in	 that	a	person	–	 the	mediator	–	has	
bound	himself	to	the	ongoing	life	of	the	world.	Not	only	is	creation	
‘textured’	 with	 the	 person	 of	 Christ,	 but	 the	 Spirit	 is	 ‘everywhere	
diffused,	[and]	sustains	all	things,	causes	them	to	grow,	and	quickens	
them	in	heaven	and	in	earth	[...]	transfusing	into	all	things	his	energy,	
and	 breathing	 into	 them	 essence,	 life,	 and	 movement’	 (I.13.14).	
Although	the	Reformed	tradition	has	been	plagued	with	a	strong	sense	
of	God’s	distance	from	creation,	here	Calvin’s	pneumatology	clearly	
reveals	creation	to	be	anything	but	external	and	‘outside’	of	God.	
Caricatures of Calvin
In	Calvin,	mediation	 is	not	about	 the	overcoming	of	a	presupposed	
boundary	between	God	and	creation	but	about	 the	proper	way	God	
and	 creation	 are	 related.	 However,	 when	 Calvin’s	 emphasis	 on	
communion	drops	 from	sight,	mediation	has	been	misinterpreted	as	
Calvin’s	 relentless	desire	 to	portray	humans	as	 incomplete,	 lacking,	
and	fundamentally	flawed.	
Does mediation imply creaturely debasement?
When	we	consider	 the	other	 side	of	Calvin’s	doctrine	of	mediation	
–	why is it that creaturely reality is not in itself capable of being in 
relation to God without a mediator?	–	Calvin	gives	two	interesting	and	
often	misconstrued	anthropological	reasons:	insufficient	righteousness	
and	creaturely	frailty.18	These	will	need	some	unpacking,	lest	they	be	
martialled	in	support	of	the	false	view	that	Calvin	degrades	creaturely	
reality.	
The	test-case	for	this	is	Calvin’s	treatment	of	angels	–	beings	who	
have	not	fallen	into	sin,	and	yet	who	still	need	a	mediator	in	order	to	
be	united	to	God.
But	the	Spirit	declares	there,	that	the	greatest	purity	is	vile,	if	it	
is	brought	into	comparison	with	the	righteousness	of	God.	We	
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must,	therefore,	conclude,	that	there	is	not	on	the	part	of	angels	
so	much	of	righteousness	as	would	suffice	for	their	being	fully	
joined	with	God.	They	have,	therefore,	need	of	a	peace	maker,	
through	whose	grace	they	may	wholly	cleave	to	God.19
Is	 Calvin	 here	 a	 sin-monger,	 detecting	 depravity	 even	 in	 angels?	
Perhaps,	but	I	think	not,	especially	when	we	remember	that	Calvin’s	
notion	of	mediation	is	governed	by	communion.	The	greater	reason	
is	 that	 Calvin	 establishes	 the	 mediator,	 rather	 than	 righteousness,	
as	 our	 primary	 bond	with	God.	The	 structure	 of	 our	 existence,	 the	
‘proper	 condition	 of	 creatures	 is	 to	 keep	 close	 to	God.’20	Not	 even	
righteousness	can	circumvent	this	primary	anthropology,	which	relates	
all	humanity	to	God	in	the	second	person	of	the	Trinity.	Calvin	views	
our	anthropology	as	occasion	for	constant	communion,	utilizing	even	
our	unfallen	state	as	proof.21	Thus	we	see	that	for	Calvin,	our	telos	is	
not	moral	perfection	(outside	the	mediator)	but	communion.22
This	 dependent,	 relational	 anthropology	 is	 compounded	 by	
Calvin’s	 second	 reason	 for	 a	 mediator:	 creaturely	 frailty.	 Unfallen	
creatures	 (and	 even	 angels)	 not	 only	 lack	 sufficient	 righteousness	
but	 their	 lives	 lack	 ‘a	 constancy	 and	 stability’.23	 Again,	 Calvin	
makes	his	point	by	using	a	best-case-scenario:	angels.	As	early	as	the	
1536	 Institutes24	Calvin	held	 that	 even	 angels	 (‘[s]o	 far	 as	 they	 are	
creatures’)	 are	 ‘liable	 to	 change	 and	 to	 sin,	 and	 consequently	 their	
happiness	would	not	have	been	eternal.	[...]	Men	had	been	lost,	and	
angels	were	not	beyond	the	reach	of	danger.’25
Calvin’s	 anthropology	 is	 here	 easily	 obscured	 when	 readers	
do	 not	 ask	what	 creaturely	 frailty	 is	 for.	 Hidden	 in	 this	 passage	 is	
Calvin’s	definition	of	the	creature:	one	whose	finitude	(and	potential	
for	 defection)	 is	 certain	 but	who has already been provided for	 in	
that	Christ	has	been	mediator	from	the	beginning	of	creation.	For	all	
too	long	the	negative	cast	of	such	a	definition	has	been	over-played.	
Interpreted	as	Calvin’s	pessimism	about	creaturely	capacity,	Calvin’s	
startling	vision	of	participation	 is	 lost.	For	Calvin,	 even	 the	perfect	
(non-fallen)	creature	must constantly be united to the mediator.	This	
is	its	condition.	This	is	its	glory.	‘The	proper	condition	of	creatures	is	
to	keep	close	to	God.’26
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It	 would	 be	 a	 common,	 but	 basic,	 error	 to	 hold	 this	 extrinsic,	
relational	 orientation	 responsible	 for	 demeaning	 creaturely	 reality	
itself.	 For	 Calvin,	 being	 creaturely	 (and	 bearing	 the	 divine	 image)	
is	 to	 accept	 gratefully	 our	 status	 as	 created	with	 its	 accompanying	
conditions	 of	 finitude.	 Calvin’s	 classic	 statement	 to	 this	 end	 is	 the	
following	(which	can	be	interpreted	in	two	quite	contrasting	ways):	
Even	 if	man	 had	 remained	 free	 from	 all	 stain,	 his	 condition	
would	 have	 been	 too	 lowly	 for	 him	 to	 reach	God	without	 a	
Mediator.	(II.12.1)
Is	this	a	negative	view	of	creatureliness?	Or	is	it	indicative	of	Calvin’s	
attempt	 to	 forge	 a	 new	 anthropology	 in	 which	 human	 beings	 are	
constituted,	 not	 by	 themselves,	 but	 by	 another?27	 Despite	 Calvin’s	
alleged	pessimism,	this	is	arguably	his	true	intent.	What	is	at	stake	is	
not	creaturely	honour	but	the	Creator-creature	distinction.28	Elsewhere	
Calvin	phrases	it	more	mildly,	saying	that	even	Adam	had	to	‘depend	
wholly	 upon	 the	 Son	 of	 God.’29	 Calvin	 can	 appear	 to	 be	 against	
humanness	but	he	is	only	against	a	humanness	not	in	communion	with	
Christ.	It	takes	careful	reading	to	pull	these	two	apart.
Does mediation imply God’s distance?
It	has	been	a	persistent	stereotype	that	Calvin’s	God	is	a	remote	deity	
who	is	separated	from	humanity	by	a	‘gulf’.	Pierre	Imbart	de	la	Tour	
laments,	 ‘God	 and	 humanity	 […]	 what	 an	 antithesis!’30	 François	
Wendel	hails	this	distance	as	Calvin’s	theological	triumph.31	Calvin’s	
doctrine	 of	mediation	 proves	 just	 how	 difficult	 it	 is	 to	 read	Calvin	
aright.	We	will	now	consider	how	Calvin’s	theology	of	mediation,	if	
not	governed	by	communion,	can	also	lead	to	this	false	definition	of	
God’s	transcendence	and	thus	separation	from	the	world.
Louis	 Bouyer	 places	 the	 blame	 on	 ‘the	 inadequate	 grasp	 of	
divine	 transcendence	 that	marks	Calvin	 […]	as	a	 child	of	his	 time;	
not	because	of	any	innovation	his	time	produced,	but	because	of	its	
inheritance	 from	 the	 late	 Middle	Ages.’32	 This	 serious	 charge	 lies	
in	 the	 inability	 to	 discern	 the	 function	 that	 transcendence	 plays	 in	
Calvin’s	 theology.	 Rather	 than	 the	 bastard	 child	 of	 nominalism,33	
transcendence	must	be	seen	against	the	background	of	medieval	piety	
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and	its	domestication	of	God,	oriented	as	it	was	away	from	communion	
and	toward	manipulation.	God	was	no	longer	free	to	offer	communion	
to	 his	 people,	 but	 ‘they	wish	 to	 hide	Him	 in	 a	 box,	 and	 they	wish	
to	carry	Him	here	and	there,	and	to	play	with	Him	as	with	a	doll.’34	
Calvin	rebelled	against	this	common	misunderstanding	in	both	piety	
and	philosophy,	by	countering	with	God’s	transcendence	and	‘glory’.
Calvin	 fights	 for	God’s	 transcendence	 not	 due	 to	 some	 abstract	
nominalist	 principle	 but	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 communion.	 God’s	
transcendence	is	not	God’s	imprisonment	over	(and	thus	out	of)	the	
world,	but	rather	his	freedom	to	be	present	to	the	world.	While	God’s	
transcendence	is	often	hailed	as	the	most	distinctive	mark	of	Reformed	
theology,	this	transcendence	(if	it	is	to	follow	Calvin)	must	not	mean	
external	 relation	 to	 the	world	 but	 the	 absolute	 freedom	with	which	
God	stands	in relation	to	his	creatures.35	It	establishes	the	radical	non-
continuity	of	grace	and	the	world;	it	certainly	does	not	establish	that	
grace	and	the	world	have	nothing	to	do	with	one	another!	Instead,	he	
offered	 the	possibility	of	a	new	way	 to	ground	 the	Creator-creature	
relation.	 Although	 it	 does	 not	 look	 promising	 to	 begin	 with	 the	
ontological	divide	between	Creator	and	creature,	it	is	only	when	this	
is	established	that	participation	is	possible.	This	is	Calvin’s	genius	and	
what	is	most	often	misunderstood	about	his	theological	program.	For	
we	must	remember	that	Calvin	believes	it	is	not	the	divine	perspective	
but	the	sinful human one	to	regard	this	ontological	divide	as	a	fearful	
separation.36
Being human
It	is	here	that	we	must	consider	the	radical	implications	of	what	Calvin	
is	saying,	particularly	as	it	relates	to	us	today.	All	too	often	we	think	
of	 ourselves	 in	 the	 terms	 established	 by	 Descartes:	 independent,	
autonomous	individuals.	Descartes	laid	down	a	whole	new	method	by	
which	we	can	establish	the	existence	of	ourselves	and	of	reality	by	our 
process of thinking.	Suddenly,	one’s	true	‘self’	can	be	isolated	from	
the	world,	under	the	assumption	that	one	can	be	a	‘self’	completely	
on	one’s	own.	
Secular	anthropology	today	begins	with	the	human	as	autonomous,	
independent	of	God,	acted	upon	by	God	only	in	an	external	manner.	
T
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Calvin’s	anthropology	hints	at	a	much	more	profound	relation,	where	
the	 fulfilment	 of	 ‘human	 potential’	 –	 to	 use	 a	 secular	 slogan	 –	 is	
defined	precisely	as	staying	in	intimacy	with	the	God	who	created	it,	
is	still	creating	it,	and	is	the	ground	of	its	uniqueness.	It	is	an	entire	
reorientation	from	the	autonomous-self	(which	is	the	ungrounded	self)	
to	the	self-in-relation.37	It	is	not	some	kind	of	cruel	flaw	that	renders	us	
incomplete	without	this	love:	it	is	our	glory.	
In	his	portrait	of	Adam,	Calvin	takes	great	pains	to	show	that	the	
‘perfection’	 of	Adam	was	 in	 his	 communion	with	God,	 not	 certain	
moral	traits,	virtues	or	intelligence	that	he	possessed.	Adam,	even	in	
the	garden,	was	to	live	a	life	of	faith	and	trust,	having	no	‘stability’	
without	the	mediator.	This	clearly	signals	the	need	for	God’s	ongoing	
involvement	 in	 human	 life	 even	 before	 the	 Fall.	 By	 design,	 the	
‘normative’	human	condition	–	even	before	sin	entered	the	scene	–	is	
participation	in	God	and	all	his	gifts.
Even	modern	theology	can	get	the	relation	of	God	and	the	world	
wrong,	by	skipping	over	this	important	insight.	The	world	is	not	full	
of	human	beings	and	God,	who	are	on	the	same	plane	of	being.	In	this	
scheme,	God	and	creation	are	pitted	against	one	another	as	ontological	
equals,	where	God’s	 transcendent	 sovereignty	 is	 his	 ability	 to	 have	
power	over	 these	creatures.	Calvin	begins	at	 another	 starting	point:	
God’s	 relation	 to creation,	 through	 the	person	of	 the	mediator.	This	
creator	God	can	neither	be	closer	nor	farther	to	us:	he	simply	is.	Christ	
is	 the	 ‘mid-point’38	between	God	and	creation,	 the	person	 in	whom	
all	 things	 exist.	 ‘Hence,	 he	 is	 not	 called	 the	 first-born,	 simply	 on	
the	ground	of	his	having	preceded	all	creatures	in	point	of	time,	but	
because	he	was	begotten	by	the	Father,	that	they	might	be	created	by	
him, and that he might be, as it were, the substance or foundation of all 
things.’39	First-born	is	not	chronology	but	rather	relational-ontology.	
We	are	‘established	upon	Him’,	the	result	of	which	is	an	‘admirable	
arrangement	and	a	well-defined	order	which	He	has	put	into	created	
things	[...]	and	we	can	behold	Him	in	all	creatures,	because	he	sustains	
all	things.’40
Many	of	these	insights	have	been	hidden	behind	Calvin’s	rhetoric.	
So,	for	example,	‘because	all	his	things	are	ours	and	we	have	all	things	
in	 him,	 in us there is nothing.’	 (III.15.5,	 my	 emphasis)	 Although	
Calvin’s	 rhetoric	 can	 degenerate	 into	 an	 obsession	 with	 creaturely	
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limitation,	what	needs	to	be	remembered	is	this:	human	limitation	is	
part	of	its	fundamental	need	for	a	divine	partner.	At	times,	this	comes	
across	as	rubbing	our	noses	in	our	own	finitude	but	Calvin’s	hope	is	
to	move	us	 to	glory	 in	our	unique	 status	as	dependent,	 loved,	even	
participating	in	God.	
Calvin’s	message	is	this:	you are not self-enclosed.	Your	truest	‘self’	
is	only	to	be	had	in	communion	with	God,	its	creator.	Participation	in	
God	 is	 not	 the	dissolving	 of	 the	 self	 in	God,	 but	 the	finding	 of	 the	
self	in	God	–	because	it	is	only	truly	‘human’	as	it	exists	in	this	deep	
communion	of	giving	and	receiving.
(Extract	 from	 Julie	 Canlis,	 Calvin’s Ladder: A Spiritual Theology 
of Ascent and Ascension,	Grand	Rapids,	Mich.:	Wm.	B.	 Eerdmans	
Publishing	Company,	2010.	Reprinted	by	permission	of	the	publisher,	
all	rights	reserved.)
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